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The Temptation of Executive Authority: How
Increased Polarization and the Decline in
Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the
Expansion of Presidential Power
EDWARD G. CARMINES* & MATTIEW FOWLER**
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that our increasingly polarized politics has led to
political stalemate and policy gridlock in Congress which, in turn, have
contributed to a change in the balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches of government; specifically, executive power has
increased at the expense of a diminished legislature. The paper will trace
the extent to which Congress has become increasingly polarized and how
this increased polarization has reduced Congress's capability and
productivity while simultaneously increasing policy gridlock resulting in
the expansion of executive power (and judicial authority) relative to
legislative authority.
INTRODUCTION
During the last two presidential administrations and especially
during the eight years of President Obama's administration, there has
been a significant expansion of executive power and a corresponding
decline in Congressional authority. This article argues that the change
in the relative balance of power between the president and Congress has
its roots in the steady increase in the ideological polarization of the
congressional parties that began more than a half century ago in the
mid-1970s. Increased polarization, by its very nature, not only makes it
more difficult for Congress to enact bipartisan legislation but especially
in conjunction with relative parity between the parties at the national
level and divided party government-two conditions that have
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characterized recent American politics-contributes to legislative
gridlock and policy stalemate.' Congress, in a nutshell, no longer seems
up to the challenge of taking effective action to deal with the major
problems facing the country. The dismal performance has led the
American public to overwhelmingly disapprove of Congress's
performance-less than one in five citizens now approve of Congress's
performance. 2 But much more ominously and consequently for the
functioning of our representative democracy, a dysfunctional Congress
has encouraged recent presidents to take unilateral actions to
implement their policy goals rather than pursuing them through
legislation. Instead of public policy being jointly determined by equal
branches of government, as envisioned by the United States
Constitution, recent policy making has been largely dominated by a
powerful executive branch with Congress playing mostly a minor,
secondary role. Policy making in the first two administrations in the
twenty-first century seems, if anything, to have further confirmed the
model and reality of presidential government. 3
This article argues that increased polarization and a decline in
legislative capacity have acted as reinforcing influences that, under
recent conditions of divided government and highly competitive,
approximate parity in the strength of parties at the national level, have
led to the expansion of executive authority at the expense of a
diminished legislature. As Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty aptly
state: "Perhaps one of the most important long-term consequences of the
decline in legislative capacity caused by polarization is that Congress's
power is declining relative to the other branches of government." 4
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section we present an
overview of the recent expansion of executive power, focusing mainly on
the sweeping regulations implemented during the Obama presidency.
Executive authority has expanded under both recent Republican and
Democratic presidents, but the expansion has been especially
pronounced during the last six years of the Obama administration.5 In
1. Frances E. Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, ANN. REV. POL. SC.
261, 267 (2015). See generally SARAH BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK (2003) (examining the history of gridlock in America).
2. Congress and the Public, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-
public.aspx (last visited March 10, 2017).
3. See generally BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT (2016) (analyzing
the historical, constitutional, and legal dimensions of presidential power).
4. Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 15, 50 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015).
5. See Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power,
Obama Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https//www.nytimes.com/2Ol6/
0814/us/politicsobama-era-legacy-regulation.html
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the second section we show that the recent increase in congressional
partisan polarization began in the mid-1970s and has steadily increased
since then. Higher levels of partisan polarization have been reached in
each successive congressional term during Obama's years, culminating
in the most polarized Congress ever in the 114th CongreSS. 6 In the third
section we discuss a variety of evidence that highlights the recent
decline in Congress's legislative capacity, a decline we argue that has
offered both an incentive and an opportunity for recent presidents to
expand their executive authority. The fourth section presents three
recent cases in which the inability of Congress to pass legislation has
led presidents to take unilateral action to implement their policy
preferences. These instances include restrictions on stem cell research
that were established during the Bush administration but were revoked
during the Obama administration and the major expansion of
environmental regulations and major changes in immigration policy
implemented during the Obama administration. In the concluding
section we ask whether future presidents are likely to follow the
unilateral policy-making model established by their recent predecessors,
thereby further contributing to the institutionalization of expanded
executive power.
I. THE RECENT EXPANSION OF ExEcuTivE POWER: AN OVERVIEW
There is a widespread perception that there has been a significant
expansion of presidential power during the first two presidential
administrations of the twenty-first century, especially during President
Obama's last six years in office. Moreover, although the expansion in
executive authority has occurred in both domestic policies and foreign
affairs in both the Bush and Obama presidencies, the relative expansion
in these two policy domains has differed in these administrations. Not
surprisingly, during the Bush administration the expansion of executive
power was most pronounced in foreign affairs. Responding to the
terrorist attack of 9/11 the Bush administration quickly established
itself as the dominant actor in dealing with terrorism, relegating
Congress to mostly an advisory and supporting role. 7 The planning and
execution of the 2003 invasion of Iraq as well as the occupation that
6. See Carroll Doherty, 7 Things to Know About Polarization in America, PEW RES.
CTR., http/ww.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/f7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-amer
ical (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
7. See generally ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: How GEORGE W.
BUSH AND HIS CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE COUNTRY AND HIJACING OUR
DEMOCRACY (2004) (giving an in-depth look at the Bush White House and the response to
national security threats).
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followed were also closely controlled by the Bush administration, again
with Congress playing a secondary role.8
This was not entirely unprecedented or unexpected. On the
contrary, going back at least to the Civil War, presidents of both parties
have greatly expanded their power during wartime, eclipsing the role of
Congress in the process. The aggrandizement of executive power during
wartime, in short, has been consistent throughout our history.9 Thus,
the Bush administration was following a well-worn precedent when it
took the lead in responding to the 9/11 terrorist attack and planned,
orchestrated, and executed the invasion of Iraq. 10
While the expansion of presidential power occurred most
dramatically and forcefully in the area of foreign policy during the Bush
administration, the expansion of executive authority during Obama's
presidency was concentrated in the domestic arena." In the 2008
presidential election campaign, candidate Obama criticized the
unilateral executive actions taken during the Bush administration and
vowed to bring a new sense of comity, cooperation, and bipartisanship to
the nation's capital. He indicated that he would much prefer to pursue
his policy goals through legislation rather than unilateral action.12 But
he quickly discovered that Republican members of Congress had no
intention of cooperating with him or his fellow Democrats in Congress to
enact his legislative proposals.1 3 During his first two years in office this
lack of GOP support though annoying and disappointing to the new
president was not crucial to the success of his legislative agenda since
Democrats had sufficiently large majorities in both the House and
Senate to pass legislation without any Republican votes. Thus, during
the first Congress of the Obama years in 2009 and 2010, Congress
enacted what would turn out to be the three landmark legislative
achievements of his entire presidency: the 800 billion dollar stimulus
economic package that stabilized and restarted a badly weakened
8. See Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, 3
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 389, 410 (2003).
9. See generally Executive Orders: Washington - Obama, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php (last updated Mar. 20, 2017) (presenting
the total number of executive orders issued by presidential term).
10. See id.
11. See Appelbaum & Shear, supra note 5; Brandice Canes-Wrone, William G. Howell,
& David E. Lewis, Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A
Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis, 70, THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 1, 16
(2008).
12. Laura Meckler, Obama Shifts View of Executive Power, WALL ST. J. (updated Mar.
30, 2012, 12:31 AM), https//ww.wsj.com/articles/SB000142405270230381290457729227366569
4712.
13. See Appelbaum & Shear, supra note 5.
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economy, the Dodd-Frank Act that tamed and reformed the risky
behavior of big banks and other major financial institutions, and the
Affordable Care Act that overhauled the nation's health care system and
eventually provided health care coverage to more than twenty million
previously uninsured citizens. 14 But with virtually no Republican votes
these legislative victories represented partisan, not bipartisan,
accomplishments.
Given that the president had not been able to garner any
Republican support for his most significant legislative initiatives during
his first two years in office, it was clear that enacting the
administration's policy goals via legislation depended critically on
maintaining Democratic control of Congress. Thus, when Republicans
regained a majority in the House as a result of the 2010 congressional
elections 15 this dealt a severe blow to any prospects of success for the
president's future legislative agenda. This result that was further
confirmed in 2012 when the party was unable to regain control in the
House and lost seats in the Senate even though the president was
reelected by a substantial margin.16
With strong Republican opposition in Congress blocking his
legislative proposals, President Obama faced a crucial choice: continue
to try to work with a recalcitrant and uncooperative Congress or use
executive authority to further his policy goals. The administration
decided to pursue the latter strategy. Thus, during the last two years of
his first term and throughout his second term President Obama
increasingly employed unilateral executive authority-at first
reluctantly but eventually with determination and enthusiasm-to
implement his policy goals.17 During his last six years, President Obama
issued hundreds of major executive orders and his departments and
agencies implemented regulations that altered significant aspects of
American life. A recent article published in The New York Times listed
the following rules and regulations as some of the most significant
issued during Obama's presidency: stricter emissions from power plants,
higher fuel efficiency standards for cars and light trucks, expanded
rights for same-sex hospital visitations, an airline passenger bill of
rights, the requirement of rearview cameras in cars and light trucks by
2018, increased pay, benefits, and overtime eligibility for federal
14. See 2009 Barack Obama Executive Orders, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/
executive-orders/barack-obama/2009 (last visited February 7, 2017).
15. See Election 2010, N. Y. TIMES, http//www.nytimes.comelectionst2Ol0/results/house.html
(last visited February 7, 2017).
16. See Election 2012, N. Y. TIMES, http1/www.nytimes.om/elections/2010/results/house.htm
(last visited February 7, 2017).
17. See Appelbaum & Shear, supra note 5.
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workers and contractors, treatment of internet companies as utilities,
conflict-of-interest rules affecting financial advisors and brokers,
overtime and minimum wage protections for home health aides, and
policies governing when and where drones can be flown by businesses
and individuals.18 As this list illustrates, unilateral executive actions
taken during Obama administration have had a significant long-term
impact on American society; they have cost businesses and consumers
billions of dollars while at the same time providing new rights and
benefits to millions of Americans.
A history of executive orders
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Figure 1
The number of executive orders issued by presidents provides one
means through which presidents can exert executive authority. Figure 1
presents the average number of executive orders issued per day by
presidents from George Washington to Barack Obama.19 This figure
shows that recent presidents have issued far fewer executive orders per
day than their predecessors during the first half of the twentieth
century and that President Obama has issued executive orders at the
slowest rate since Grover Cleveland. This comparison highlights the
18. Id.
19. James Delorey, Everything You Need to Know About the Erratic Quality of Topical
Twitter Charts in Five Charts, GLOBAL STRATEGY GROUP (Feb. 6, 2014), httpJ/www.globalstra
teggup.com/2014/02/everhing-need-knowerratic-quality-topical-twitter-charts-five-charts/
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limitations of using the number of executive orders as a measure of
executive authority.20 Some executive orders are substantive in nature
but others are mainly symbolic. Relying only on the number of executive
orders conflates these two, very different types of executive orders and
thus provides an imperfect indication of the exercise of executive
authority.
Number of Executive-Issued Regulations
by Type
1200
Major Econornicaty Significant
Note: Data from the U.S. Government Accountability office &
1M George W. Bush
la Barack Obamna
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
Figure 2
Fortunately, however, the government publishes two sources of data
on regulations that have high impact and broad reach, defined as
regulations with impacts (benefits or costs) of one hundred million or
more in a year. 21 These two similar measures refer to "major" and
"economically significant" regulations. Figure 2 presents information on
these measures for the Bush and Obama administrations. 22 Clearly,
20 See generally DANIEL GITTERMAN, CALLING THE SHOTS: THE PRESIDENT,
EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2017) (providing readers with a general
treatment of presidential use of executive orders).
21. Congressional Review Act, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.g
ao.gov/legal/congressional-review-act/overview; Search of Regulatory Review, OFFICE OF
INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, https://www.reginf.gov/public/doleoAdvanc
edSeatrhMain.
22. Id.
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there has been a substantial increase in the number of significant
regulations issued during Obama's presidency. In fact, there has been
an increase of twenty-nine percent in major regulations and an increase
of twenty-eight percent in economically significant regulations finalized
during President Obama's tenure in office compared to the previous
Bush administration.
II. AN INCREASINGLY POLARIZED CONGRESS
The steadily increasing levels of partisan polarization in Congress,
we argue, make it more difficult for Congress to produce bipartisan
legislation. Instead, under current political conditions a highly polarized
Congress leads to political stalemate and policy gridlock and thus
undermines Congress's ability to engage in effective policy making.
Party Polarization 1879-2013
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Figure 3
Figure 3 presents a graphical portrayal of partisan polarization in
both the House and Senate from 1879 to 2013.23 The measure of
polarization, referred to as DW-Nominate scores, is based on all roll-call
votes taken in each chamber over this period and may be interpreted as
23. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW, http://www.voteview.com/po
litical-polarization_2015.htm (last updated Jan. 30, 2016).
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the ideological difference between the parties. 24 Higher scores indicate a
greater level of ideological difference or polarization between the
parties; lower scores indicate a lower level of polarization.
The figure shows that partisan polarization was relatively low
between the 1930s and the mid-1970s in both chambers. During this
period not only did both parties include a large number of ideological
moderates in their ranks, but there were also sizable contingents of
liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats in both chambers.
During this period both parties were ideologically diverse and the
difference between the average Democrat and Republican was small.
The overlap in the ideological composition of the parties together with
the relatively small ideological gap between them made it easier to
strike legislative compromises so that bills were often passed with
bipartisan coalitions.
But beginning in the mid-1970s there has been a steady and steep
upward movement in the ideological distance between the parties in
both the House and Senate. 25 In fact, virtually every new Congress
during the last forty years has been more polarized than its predecessor;
thus President Obama faced the most polarized Congress in modern
American history. 26 Today, the ideological profiles of both congressional
parties are much more distinct from one another and both parties are
less ideologically diverse. 27 Indeed, according to McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal (2006) there is now no ideological overlap between the
parties: the most liberal Republican member of Congress is more
conservative than the most conservative Democratic member.
28Furthermore, the growing ideological divergence between the
congressional parties has been accompanied by an emptying of the
political center of both parties so that are fewer moderates in both
chambers.
24. See Nolan M. MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, INCOME
REDISTRIBUTION AND THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICS 3-5 (1997).
25. See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 1 (2006) [hereinafter MCCARTY,
POOLE & ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA].
26. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, supra note 23.
27. See id.
28. See MCCARTY, POOLE & ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA, supra note 25 at 4-5.
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Figure 4
The increasing ideological divergence between congressional parties
is not the result of Republicans moving to the right and Democrats
moving an equal distance to the left. Quite the contrary, as Figure 4
makes clear, Republicans in the House have moved much further in a
rightward direction than House Democrats have moved leftward. 29 In
other words, partisan polarization in the Congress has not been
symmetric but decidedly asymmetric. The GOP in Congress has become
a full throated conservative party. Figure 4 also indicates that the
leftward movement among Democrats has been confined to Southern
Democrats-reflecting the increased number of House Democrats in the
South who are African Americans.
How does polarization affect legislative policy making? At least
theoretically it is possible for a highly polarized legislature featuring
ideologically cohesive parties to be quite effective in enacting legislation,
even on controversial issues. In particular, when conditions of unified
party government prevail with the president's party having a clear
majority in the House of Representatives and a supermajority of at least
60 members in the Senate, then partisan polarization does not
necessarily have detrimental effects on policy making. Under these
conditions, polarization poses no particular barrier to policy making
because one party is in charge of all of the major levers of government
29. See id. at 11.
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power. But when one or more of these conditions does not exist-as has
been typically the case during the last several decades-then a higher
level of congressional polarization undermines policy making. In other
words, recent conditions of divided party government and relatively
narrow partisan majorities in Congress have provided a political context
within which increased polarization has had strongly negative effects on
the quality and quantity of public policy. The wide ideological gap that
now exists between the typical Democratic member and the typical
Republican member makes it much more difficult for their respective
parties to bridge their policy differences and reach bipartisan
compromises. Instead, under current conditions increased polarization
makes it more likely that political stalemate and policy gridlock will
occur.
III. DECLINING LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTIVITY
Has Congress's capacity to legislate declined in recent decades and
is the decline due at least partially to an increase in partisan
polarization? Has partisan polarization undermined the performance of
Congress, reducing its policy making capability? In short, has
polarization lead to a dysfunctional Congress? These are large and
complicated questions that do not yield to simple or definitive answers.
But there is a wide variety of evidence that suggests that Congress's
legislative capability has declined in recent decades as a result of
increased polarization.
For example, Figure 5 depicts the number of bills passed by each
Congress from 93rd through the 113th, the next to last term of Congress
during Obama's tenure in office (2013-14).30 Constructed by the
Washington Post, the graph shows a significant decline in productivity
over time.31 The 113th Congress passed fewer bills than any other in
memory; in fact, this was the least productive Congress since the late
1800s, when polarization was equivalent to the level it is today. 32
30. See Philip Bump, The 113th Congress Is Historically Good at Not Passing Bills,
WASH. POST (July 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/201407/09/the-
113th-congress-is-historicaly-good-at-not-passing-billsutmterm-.903a7c770db7.
31. Id.
32. See id.
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McCarty's research focusing on the passage of landmark legislation
also points to the powerful influence of polarization on Congress's
productivity. 34 His analysis indicated that the "10 least-polarized
congressional terms produced almost 16 significant enactments per
term, whereas the 10 most-polarized terms only slightly more than
10."35
Binder developed a novel measure of legislative productivity based
on the extent to which Congress acted on salient pubic issues as
revealed by unsigned editorials published in The New York Times. She
found that not only has there been a secular increase in the frequency of
inaction by Congress over time but that the most dysfunctional
Congress since 1947-48 was the 112th Congress, at the height of
polarization up to that time.
33. Phillip Bump, The 113th Congress is Historically Good at Not Passing Bills, THE
WASHINGTON POST (July 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/07/09/t
he-113th-congress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bilsputm term-.903a7c770db7.
34. Nolan McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political Polarization, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 223, 232-40 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds.,
2007).
35. Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 15, 42 (Nathanial Persily ed., 2015).
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Figure 7
The inability of Congress to pass the annual appropriation bills
before the beginning of the fiscal year is another sign of Congress's
recent dismal performance. Figure 7 graphs for each month since 1974
the proportion of regular appropriation bills passed prior to that
month.39 The figure also presents a smoothing curve that reflects long-
term trends.40 Barber and McCarty point out that the dismal
performance of Congress in timely passing appropriations bills does not
closely track the continuous rise in polarization over the last forty
years. 41 But the two trends do closely match each other since 2000,
which suggests that polarization may have contributed to the especially
poor performance of Congress in passing appropriations on time in
recent years.
39. Barber & McCarty, supra note 4, at 42.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Figure 8 plots cloture voting in the Senate since 1912-13.42 The
figure displays the number of cloture motions filed, the number that
came to a vote, and the number approved.43 Cl0ture motions are usually
employed by the majority party to end debate on pending bills-that is,
to end filibusters by the minority party. Clearly, cloture voting has
increased significantly over the last fifty years. Part of this change has
to do with rules changes enacted by the Senate in 1975 that lowered the
requirement for invoking cloture from two-thirds of senators voting to
three-fifths of elected senators. However, the change also reflects the
more widespread use of delaying tactics and obstructionist strategies
employed by the minority party as a result of increased partisan
polarization. Indeed, hyper partisanship has created what amounts to a
"60-vote Senate" in which virtually every piece of substantive legislation
must demonstrate that it has the approval of a three-fifths majority
required for cloture.44 This requirement often prevents the Senate from
voting on even modestly controversial legislation.
42. Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloture-moti
ons/clotureCounts.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
43. Id.
44. See STEVEN S. SMITH, THE SENATE SYNDROME: THE EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURAL
WARFARE IN THE MODERN U.S. SENATE 122 (2014).
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Finally, consider Figure 9, which charts the length of time in days
that the Senate takes to consider presidential nominees for U.S. Circuit
and District Courts. 46 Since Reagan, presidents have typically waited
much longer for confirmation votes than their immediate predecessor. 47
Increased polarization has made it more difficult for the Senate to fulfill
one of its most important constitutional responsibilities.
All of this evidence points to the conclusion that Congress's
capability has declined in recent decades partially as a result of
increased polarization. Simply stated, Congress is underperforming as a
problem-solving institution and not functioning as a coequal branch of
government.
IV. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND POLARIZATION: THREE CASE STUDIES
Congressional inaction because of polarization has led to an increase
in major policy initiatives being implemented through unilateral
presidential discretion rather than legislation. 48 The number of bills
passed by Congress has been on the decline for the last couple of
decades. 49 Congress has become ideologically bifurcated and unwilling
45. http://www.factcheck.org/2013/06/obamas-judicial-juggling/
46. Id. at 197.
47. See id.
48. See Appelbaum & Shear, supra note 5.
49. See id.
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to compromise leading to stalemate.50 Though their actions are not
unprecedented, recent presidents have utilized congressional gridlock to
expand their powers. 5 ' The following case studies illustrate the
unilateral expansion in presidential authority during the presidencies of
George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
Interestingly, this expansion of executive power is not isolated to
one party, and is evidenced in years when presidential and
congressional party control is aligned but especially when it is not.
Though the number of executive orders has not increased significantly
compared to past decades (in fact, it has declined), 52 the substantive
impact of some of them has expanded.55 Therefore, we are seeing a
qualitative expansion of power, rather than a qualitative increase. The
following three case studies demonstrate the expansion of presidential
power. Unilateral executive action was taken by these two presidents
when Congress failed to act on stem-cell research, climate change, and
immigration. 54 These case studies represent presidents furthering their
own policy positions without congressional authority, and each issue has
seen its day in court. Judicial action has been sought in an attempt to
temper and restrain presidential ambition at power expansion.
A. Stem Cells
Stem cell research is a contentious issue in American politics. The
various conceptions of when life begins create a sharp rift in the
American public and among members of Congress who represent their
constituents' views. Conservatives often stand firmly in the belief that
life begins at conception, whereas liberals tend to be less convinced or at
least skeptical of this categorical definition.55 This rift can lead to
stalemate in policy making by a polarized Congress. Abortion
legislation, closely tied to stem cell research, is never easily passed in
Congress and sent to the president for approval or veto.56 Stem cell
research offers possibilities for treating and curing a number of
ailments. However, the origins of stem cells and the ethical grounds for
50. See Bump, supra note 30.
51. See Jacob S. Hacker & Oona A. Hathaway, Beware an Unchecked President, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (2013).
52. See Executive Orders: Washington - Obama, supra note 9.
53. See Kenneth R. Mayer & Kevin Price, Unilateral Presidential Powers: Significant
Executive Orders, 1949-99, 32, PRES. STUD. QUARTERLY, 367, 386 (2002).
54. See Appelbaum & Shear, supra note 5
55. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Puts His Own Spin on Mix of Science With
Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2009), httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/us/pohtics/l1obama.htm
1? rz4.
56. See id.
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their use and disposal in research facilities, particularly embryonic stem
cells, is a hotly contested issue that has made the rounds in all branches
of government.57
In 1996, the so-called "Dickey Amendment," which was signed by
President Clinton, prohibited the Department of Health and Human
Services from using federal funds for creating human embryos for
research purposes or for research where embryos are destroyed.5 8 Five
years later, President Bush furthered a policy whereby federal funds
could be used for some pre-existing stem cell lines, but not those from
newer lines of stem cells.59 He also created the President's Council on
Bioethics to monitor stem cell research regulations.6 0 At the time,
Congress was controlled by Republicans and President Bush had little
reason to push forward his own policy initiatives and expand the role of
the executive branch in this policy area. However, over the course of his
presidency, the Bush administration's posture on this issued changed as
the partisan composition of Congress shifted.
Congress changed party control in 2006, but in 2005 the Stem Cell
Research Enhancement Act was passed by both the House and Senate
largely along party lines. 6 1 Democrats were able to convince enough
Republicans to join their ranks to pass the bill, but President Bush used
his first veto in office to override the bill.62 Similarly, the Stem Cell
Research Enhancement Act of 2007 was passed by Congress (largely
along partisan lines) and was vetoed again by President Bush.63
Immediately afterward, in June 2007, President Bush faced a
Democratic Congress that would not heed to his own policy inclinations.
Therefore, he took it upon himself to issue Executive Order 13455.64 The
executive order instructed the Secretary of Health and Human Services
57. See id.
58. Shannon McGuire, Embryonic Stem Cells: Marrow of the Dickey Matter, 11 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 160, 177 (2010).
59. See Maya Jackson Randall & Mark H. Anderson, Judge Backs Obama Order on
Stem Cells, WALL ST. J (July 28, 2011), httpJ/www.wsj.mm/articles/B1000142405311190488
8304576472010761428264.
60. Exec. Order No. 13237, 3 C.F.R. § 13237 (2001), https//www.gpo.gov/fisys/granule/CFR
-2002-title3-voll/CFR-2002-title3-voll-eo13237.
61. Carl Hulse, On Wave of Voter Unrest, Democrats Take Control of House, NEW
YORK TIMES, (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.nytimes.om/2006/11/08/uspolidcs/08house.htil-
Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2005),
https://www.govtrack.us/congressibills/109/hr810.
62. See Message to the House of Representatives, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1424 (July 19, 2006).
63. Vetoes by President George W. Bush, U.S. SENATE, httpsJ/www.senate.gov/refereneIe
gislafionfVetoes/BushGW.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
64. Expanding Approved Stem Cell Lines in Ethically Responsible Ways, 72 Fed. Reg.
34591 (June 20, 2007).
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to support research in stem cells, but severely restricted research
involving embryonic stem cells.6 5
After fewer than two months in office, President Obama issued
Executive Order 13505: "Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific
Research Involving Human Stem Cells".66 In signing the order,
President Obama declared that his administration would "make
scientific decisions based on facts, not ideology."67 The order lifted the
restrictions from Bush's actions on stem cells, specifically his 2001
action that barred the National Institutes of Health from funding
research on embryonic stem cells beyond the cell lines existing at the
time.6 8 Though Executive Order 13505 does not overturn the Dickey
Amendment, the order does expand the ability of researchers to use
federal funds for human embryonic stem cell research.69 President
Obama also called on Congress to push for removing further restrictions
on stem cell research, but no such legislative action was taken.
The courts, on the other hand, have taken up the issue. A matter of
months after Executive Order 13505 was signed, a group of stem cell
scientists led by James Sherley filed suit again the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius. 70 The suit claimed that the
executive order violated the Dickey Amendment barring federal funding
of embryonic stem cell research.7 ' The U.S. District Court ruled in favor
of embryonic stem cell research with Chief Justice Lambert claiming the
"policy question is not answered by any congressional law, and it has
fallen on three presidential administrations to provide an answer." 72
Since that time, a U.S. Appeals Court upheld the ruling and the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to take up the case, effectively leaving the lower
court ruling intact.73
These executive orders have expanded the power of the presidency
by unilaterally implementing policy on a controversial issue without the
participation of Congress. With Congress failing to take decisive action
65. See id.
66. Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem
Cells, 74 Fed. Reg. 10677 (Mar. 9, 2009) (revoking Executive Order 13435 to allow for the
federal funding of stem cell research).
67. Stolberg, supra note 55.
68. Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem
Cells, supra note 64, at 10668.
69. See id. at 10667.
70. Randall & Anderson, supra note 59.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Meredith Wadman, High Court Ensures Continued US Funding of Human
Embryonic-Stem-Cell Research, NATURE (Jan 7, 2013), http://www.nature.com/news/high-
court-ensures-continued-us-funding-of-human-embryonic-stem-cell-research-1.12171.
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on this issue, recent presidents have used executive authority to further
their policy preferences.
B. Climate Change
The issue of climate change was once a matter of only slight policy
differences between the parties, as both parties took similar positions in
this policy area. But current debates have focused on whether the
phenomenon even exists, disregarding scientific evidence that the
detrimental effects of climate change are a certainty. 74 Accordingly,
Republicans and Democrats in Congress have been largely unable to
address the issue and enact bipartisan legislation to address it.
Congressional inaction on the issue originated with Republican
obstruction based on beliefs that scientific evidence concerning climate
change is inconclusive if not altogether wrong. However, a consensus
exists within the scientific community that climate change is a major
national security issue that will negatively impact the entire planet.75
For the most part, congressional Democrats have adopted this position.
Congress has been incapacitated by these starkly differing assessments
of the existence and consequences of climate change. Therefore,
legislation addressing this crucial area of public policy has not been
enacted because of polarization-inspired inaction.76 As a result,
President Obama has taken unilateral actions to fill the policy vacuum
created by a deadlocked Congress.
An international treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, was created in 1997 and
was aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions under the assumption
that man-made C02 emissions are causing damaging climate change
effects.77 However, shortly after taking office, President Bush refused to
send the Protocol to Congress for a vote and declared his own strong
opposition to the treaty.78
Legislation addressing and capping C02 emissions was introduced in
Congress three times during President Bush's tenure in office. The
74. Scientific Consensus: Earth's Climate is Warming, NASA (2016), http//chmate.nasa.
gov/scientific-consensus/ (last updated Feb. 16, 2017); Chelsea Harvey, Members of Congress
Met to Discuss the Costs of Climate Change. They Ended Up Debating its Existence, THE
WASHINGTON POST. (Feb. 28, 2017), httpsJ/www.washingtonpost
.com/news/energyenvirnment/wp/2017/02/28/membersof-congress-met-todiscuss-the-oastsof-
climate-change-they-ended-up-debating-its-existencePutm term=.445fd3cl308f
75. See Scientific Consensus: Earth's Climate Is Warming, NASA, http//climate.nasa.gov/
scientific-consensus/ (last updated Feb. 16, 2017).
76. See Frances E. Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, 18 ANN. REV. POL.
Scl. 261, 274 (2015).
77. KENNEDY, JR., supra note 7, at 48.
78. See id. at 51-52.
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Climate Stewardship Act was initially voted on in the Senate in 2003.79
The bill aimed to be a bipartisan effort introduced by Republican
Senator John McCain and Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman to
institute a cap and trade standard for greenhouse gases, but was
defeated forty-three to fifty-five with few senators departing from party-
line voting.80 A similar bill was voted on in the Senate in 2005, but was
again voted down.8 1 In 2007, the bill was referred to committee, but was
never even brought before the Senate for a vote. 82
A few other bills have been introduced but have never left
committee. The Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007, the
Climate Protection Act, and the Sustainable Energy Act of 2013 all died
before reaching a vote.83 The American Clean Energy and Security Act
of 2009 was approved in the House by a vote of 219 to 212 (with 8
Republicans supporting the bill), but failed to progress further.84
Finally, Republicans in the House submitted the Energy Tax Prevention
Act to the House for a vote in 2011. The bill passed the House, as
expected along partisan lines (all the nay votes came from Democrats);
however, it died in committee in the Senate before coming to a floor
vote. The bill would have amended the Clean Air Act by preventing the
EPA from regulating greenhouse gas emissions as pollutants or
contributing to climate change.85
Climate change policy was not a high priority during the Bush
presidency and few executive actions were taken during these eight
years. His administration did attempt to pressure scientists into
censuring their disclosure of scientific evidence of man-made climate
change.8 6 President Bush's administration also edited a Center for
Disease Control (CDC) report given to Congress, taking out portions
79. Id. at 146-47.
80. Climate Stewardship Act, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003), httpsJ/www.govtrack.us/congre
ss/bills/108/sl39.
81. Energy Policy Act, S. Amdt. 826 to H.R. 6, 119th Cong. (2005), httpsJ/www.senate.go
v/legislative/LI Srollcall_1sts/rollcalLvotescfm.cfm?congress=109&session-1&vote)00148.
82. Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act, S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s280.
83. Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007-2008),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/309; Climate Protection Act, S.
332, 113th Cong. (2013), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s332; Sustainable
Energy Act, 3. 329, 113th Cong., https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s329.
84. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454.
85. Energy Tax Prevention Act, S. 482, 112th Cong. (2001), https1/www.govtrack.us/congr
ess/bills/112/s482.
86. Dan Froomkin, Cheney: Neither Here Nor There?, WASHINGTON POST. (June 21,
2007), httpJ//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/cntent/blog/2007/06/21/BL2007062101075.html?na
v-hcmodule.
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that described the negative effects of climate change on human health.87
Unlike President Obama, however, he issued few executive orders
addressing climate change and the environment.88 The most significant
of Bush's executive orders (13432) was signed in 2007 and sought to
limit greenhouse gas emissions over time. But Bush faced criticism for
the plan, as many saw his efforts as weak after not addressing the issue
until the end of his presidency.89
President Obama took more decisive actions in the face of
congressional inaction. First, he established a new office in the White
House with the specific purpose of working to produce climate change
policy based on scientific recommendations.9 0 President Obama's
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, appointed Todd Stern as the State
Department's Special Envoy for Climate Change in 2009 and shortly
afterward initiated a new climate treaty, the Copenhagen Accord, that
proposed U.S. goals on emissions in the international arena.91 According
to WikiLeaks, the U.S. may have also used unsavory methods for
obtaining support for the accord. 92
In multiple budget proposals, President Obama proposed increased
funding for clean or renewable sources of energy. Cap and trade
programs have been the central element of these reforms. In addition,
just a few days after taking office, President Obama issued several
memoranda aimed at lowering greenhouse gas emissions and raising
fuel economy standards in vehicles. 93
President Obama also signed several significant executive orders
aimed at fighting climate change. In 2009, he issued the Federal
Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance
87. White House Edited Testimony, CDC Official Says, LOS ANGELES TIIMES (Oct 24,
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/24/nation/na-speech24.
88. George W. Bush Executive Order Subjects, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https//www.archives.
gov/federal-register/executive-orders/wbush-subjects.htnL
89. Exec. Order No. 13432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27717 (May 16, 2007), http-1/www.presidency.ucs
b.edu/wsPpid=75108.
90. See Climate Change, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, https1/obamawhitehouse.archi
ves.gov/energy/climate-change (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
91. See Damian Carrington, WikiLeaks Cables Reveal How US Manipulated Climate
Accord, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2010, 4:30 PM), https1/www.theguardianacom/environment/2010/de
c/O3/wikieaks-us-manipulated-clmate-accord Garance Franke-Ruta, Stern Appointed Climate
Change Envoy, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2009), http/voices.washingtonpostcom/44/2009/0
1/26/stern appointed climate change.html?hpid-topnews.
92. See id.
93. Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Obama Issues Orders Toward More Fuel-Efficient
Cars, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2009), http//www.washingtonpostcom/wp-dyn/ontentarticle/2009/
01/26/AR2009012602028.htmL
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order94 and in 2013, the Preparing the United States for the Impacts of
Climate Change order.95 Executive Order 13677, entitled Climate-
Resilient International Development, directed climate considerations to
be an integral part of all U.S. international development initiatives.96
President Obama's latest executive order on climate change, titled
Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade, ordered federal
agencies to work toward limited greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent
by 2025.97
Finally, the EPA under President Obama's authority issued the
Clean Power Plan in August of 2015. The plan increased regulations on
power plants and set goals for state-by-state reduction in carbon
emissions.98 Criticism of the plan was sharp and immediate. Several
states issued a lawsuit for an immediate stay of the plan.9 9 Conversely,
twenty states have signaled support for the plan. In February of 2016, a
split vote of five to four in the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the EPA to
stop enforcement of the plan until a lower court rules on the matter. 100
C. Immigratiwn
During the course of the Bush and Obama administrations,
immigration reform has been raised a number of times. None of these
have led to substantive change in law or policy. In 2005, the House
passed the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration
Control Act 01 along partisan lines with more than 90 percent of
Republicans in support and more than 80 percent of Democrats
opposing.1 02 Introduced by Representative James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
94. Executive Order 13514 of Oct. 5, 2009, Federal Leadership in Environmental,
Energy, and Economic Performance, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (Oct. 8, 2009).
95. Executive Order 13653 of Nov. 1, 2013, Preparing the United States for the
Impacts of Climate Change, 78 Fed. Reg. 66819 (Nov. 6, 2013).
96. See Executive Order 13677 of Sept. 23, 2014, Climate-Resilient International
Development, 79 Fed. Reg. 58231, 58231 (Sept. 26, 2014).
97. See Executive Order 13693 of Mar. 19, 2015, Planning for Federal Sustainability in
the Next Decade, 80 Fed. Reg. 15871 (Mar. 25, 2015).
98. See Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64663-65 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
99. See Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Andrew M. Harris, Obama's Clean Power Plan Heads to
Court: What to Know, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23 2016, 5:00 AM), https/www.bloomberg.com/new
s/articles/2016-09-23/obama-s-clean-power-plan-heads-to-court-what-to-know.
100. Alan Neuhauser, Supreme Court Blocks Signature Obama Climate Rule, U.S.
NEWS (Feb. 10, 2016, 8:18 AM), httpJ/www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-02-10/supreme-court-
puts-epas-clean-power-plan-on-hold
101. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
102. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 661, U.S. HOUSE, http/clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/ro
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"the bill focused on increased enforcement along the Southern border. 103
The bill failed to gain support in the Senate. 104 Similarly, the
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, introduced by Senator
Arlen Specter, passed the Senate but not the House.10 5 The bill would
have provided amnesty for illegal immigrants who were in the country
for an extended period of time and increased legal immigration.106 No
compromise between the two chambers was ever reached. A similar bill
was introduced in the Senate the next year, but failed to pass as both
liberals and conservatives had unresolved reservations about the bill. 107
During his time in office, President Bush signed two executive
orders on immigration. The first, Executive Order 13269, expedited the
naturalization of "aliens and noncitizen nationals" serving in active-
duty status during the War on Terrorism. The other order merely
delegated responsibilities dealing with immigration in the Caribbean
region. 0 Although President Bush was highly involved in the
immigration reform fight in the House and Senate during his second
term, he failed to persuade Congress to pass any significant changes in
immigration policy. He came into office with high hopes for immigration
reform in conjunction with Mexican President Vincente Fox, but the
attacks of September 11, 2001 put these plans on hold and they were
never revived while he was in office. 0 9
The most far reaching changes in immigration reform, instead, came
from President Barack Obama. After proposing legislation that never
11661.xml (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
103. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005) §§ 309, 607, 1004; All Bill Information (Except Text) For
H.R.4437, CONGRESS, https//www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/4437/all-info?r=1#m
ajor-actions (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
104. See All Bill Information (Except Text) For H.R.4437, supra note 101.
105. All Bill Information (Except Text) for S.2611, CONGRESS, https//www.cngress.gov/bill
/109th-congress/senate-bi/2611/all-infor=1 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017); see also Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
106. Senate Passes Immigration Bill, CNN (May 26, 2006, 3:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com
/2006/POLITICS/05/25/immigrationlindex.html?iref-newssearch; see also Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
107. S.9 - Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, CONGRESS, httpsJ/www.mongre
ss.gov/bill/110th-ongress/senate-bi/9q-/`7B%22search%22%/3A%5B%22Comprehensive+Inmigr
aition+Reform+Act+of+2006%22%5D%7D&r-3 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017); see also
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 9, 110th Cong. (2007).
108. John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, (2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/executive-orders.phpyear-2001&Submit=DISPLAY. See
also Exec. Order No. 13276, 67 Fed. Reg. 29985 (Nov. 15, 2002), httpsJ/www.gpo.gov/fdsys4
kg/FR-2002-11-19/pdM02-29580.pdf
109. Alfredo Corchado, Once Solid, the George W. Bush-Vicente Fox Partnership Faded
After 9/11, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Apr. 2013), https1/www.dallasnews.com/news/mexic)
/2013/04126/one-solid-the-george-w.-bush-vicente-fox-partnership-faded-after-911.
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came to fruition, he took unilateral and significant action on
immigration during his presidency. President Obama sent Congress a
sweeping immigration reform bill during his first year in office, but was
rebuffed by Senate Republicans. 110 With comprehensive immigration
reform out of the picture, President Obama instead focused on increased
border enforcement and ramped up deportations.
The Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America's Security and
Prosperity Act of 2009 was introduced in President Obama's first year,
but never made it out of committee.11' The next attempt for immigration
reform that seemed most likely to succeed was the American DREAM
Act. Originally introduced in 2001, the Act has been reintroduced
several times but has always failed to win congressional approval. 112
The intention of the act is to make it easier for some immigrants to
achieve temporary or permanent resident status in the United States.113
President Obama pushed for reintroduction of the bill in the House in
2010.114 While it passed the lower chamber, the bill failed to meet the
sixty-vote threshold in the Senate.1 5
Immigration reform represents perhaps the most robust case of
expansion of executive power in the face of congressional polarization
and gridlock. The bipartisan "Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
110. See Josh Hicks, Obama's Failed Promise of a First-Year Immigration Overhaul,
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2012), httpsJwww.washingtonpostcom/blogs/fact-checker/postlobamas-
failed-promise-of-a-first-year-imigration-overhaul/2012/09/25/06997958-0721-11e 2 -alc-
fa5a255a9258_blog.html.utnterm=.9a41482ccc3.
111. H.R.4321 - CIR ASAP Act of 2009, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bilIIll/th-
congress/house-bill/4321/al-actions (last visited Apr. 3, 2016); see also Comprehensive
Immigration Reform for America's Security and Prosperity Act of 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th
Cong. (2009-10).
112. Dream Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001-2002), https://www.congress.govfbill/107th-
congress/senate-bill/1291; Dream Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003-2004), https//www.congre
ss.gov/bil/108th-congres/senate-bill/1545; Dream Act, S. 2075, 109th Cong (2006-2006),
https://www.congress.gov/bilI/109th-congress/senate-bill/2075; Dream Act, S. 2205, 110th
(2007-2008), httpsJ/www.congress.gov/billlOth-congress/senate-bill/2205; Dream Act, S. 3992,
111th Cong. (2009-2010), https://www.congress.govbil/111th-congress/senate-bill/3992;
Dream Act, s. 952, 112th Cong. (2011-2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-
congress/senate-biW952.
113. See generally DREAM Act, S. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing a process by
which immigrants who satisfy certain requirements first gain conditional residency);
DREAM Act, S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009) (same); DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003)
(same); DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001) (same).
114. See DREAM Act, S. 3962 111th Cong. (2010).
115. H.R.6497 - DREAM Act of 2010, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/billIl/th-
congress/house-bill/6497?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22DREAM+Act%22%5D%7D&r
=1 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017); see also DREAM Act, S. 3992, 111th Cong (2009-2010),
httpsJ/www.congress.g
ov/bill/111th-congms/senate-bil/3992/all-actions?overview-closed&/o7B%22roll-call-vote%22 0/o3A
%22all%22%7D.
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and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013" passed the Senate but has
remained stalled in the House. 116 This stalemate likely set the stage for
the unilateral action carried out by President Obama in November of
2014. President Obama did not issue an executive order on immigration
in 2014.117 However, he used presidential authority to make
discretionary changes to what would and wouldn't be enforced by the
executive branch of government. In June of 2012, the Obama
administration began what was called the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy that allowed children who entered the
country before June 2007 to receive temporary work permits and made
them exempt from deportation. 118 The controversial executive actions in
2014 expanded this program with the Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans (DAPA) policy. Similar to the policy for children, this action
allowed parents of American citizens or lawful permanent residents to
receive work permits and deportation exemptions.119
Controversy, as expected, followed this decision. The courts are still
debating the matter after twenty-six states with Republican governors
sued in a Texas District Court to halt the actions undertaken as a result
of both the DACA and DAPA executive orders. 120 In February of 2015,
the Texas court ordered a preliminary injunction. 121 The Obama
administration issued a failed appeal, and the U.S. Department of
Justice appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case while
116. See generally DREAM Act, S. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing a process by
which immigrants who satisfy certain requirements first gain conditional residency);
DREAM Act, S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009) (same); DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003)
(same); DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001) (same), Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013)
httpsY/www.congress.gov/bil/113th-congress/senate-bill/744?q%=/7B%22sean-h%22/`3A%5B%22Bo
rder+Securityo2C+Emnomic+Opportunity%2C+and+mmigration+Modernization+Act+of+2013%2
20/o5D7D&r-2; Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act of 201, H.R. 15, 113th Cong. (2013) httpsJ/www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congressthouse-
bill/15?q-%7B%22search%22%3A5B%22Border-Security%2C+EconomiiOpportunity/`2C+and+
Immigration+Modernization+Actof+2013%22%5D/o7D&r-1; Steven Smith, The Senate
Syndrome: The Evolution of Parliamentary Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate (2014).
117. Christopher Ingraham, A history of executive orders, American Presidency Project
(2014), http://imgur.com/L5Da4bN.
118. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Le6n
Rodriguez, Director for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al. (June 15, 2012),
available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo-deferred-action.pdf.
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Texas urged the Court to not consider an appeal. 122 In January of 2016
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.123 House Republicans,
under the direction of Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, have since
moved to vote on a resolution to allow the chamber to file a brief in the
Supreme Court case of United States v. Texas.124 Until the case is heard,
Obama's immigration actions are on hold.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that the expansion of executive power and the
decline in legislative authority have been fueled by complementary
forces of increased congressional polarization and decreased legislative
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Working Group, its website states that "the impetus for establishing the
group is the widespread perception that Congress is dysfunctional,"1 27
adding that the objectives of the group are twofold: "[tlo create an
enduring, bipartisan space to assess the capacity of Congress to perform
its constitutional duties; and [t]o collaborate on ideas for improving the
legislative branch's performance in our separation of powers system."1 28
As we reviewed earlier, there is extensive and varied evidence
demonstrating the recent decline in Congress's capacity to engage in
effective policy making. From delays and failures in passing
appropriation bills to enacting less legislation overall, there is abundant
evidence that the contemporary Congress lacks the capacity and
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government.
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his administration substantially outpaced his immediate predecessor. 132
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that would have strong support in the Republican Congress. Moreover,
with Republican majorities in both the House and Senatel 34 President
Trump will face a more cooperative Congress than Obama did in the
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Senate.13 5 Indeed, with forty-eight members in the "60 vote Senate"
Democrats can frustrate many of Trump's policy initiatives. 3 6 Under
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president it seems very unlikely that faced with an uncooperative
Congress he will be able to resist the temptation of taking unilateral
actions to implement his policy goals, thereby further extending the
scope and reach of executive power.
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